Economic and Fiscal Policy - Cabinet Office Home Page

Past speeches by Treasury leaders on New Zealand's long-term fiscal outlook can be found at:

Statements on New Zealand's Long-term Fiscal Position

For FY 2013, we rebased and revised the market basket used under the LTCH PPS by adopting the newly created FY 2009-based LTCH-specific market basket. In addition, beginning in FY 2013, we determined the labor-related share annually as the sum of the relative importance of each labor-related cost category of the 2009-based LTCH-specific market basket for the respective fiscal year based on the best available data. (For more details, we refer readers to the FY 2013 IPPS/LTCH PPS final rule ( through 53479).) As noted previously, we rebased and revised the 2009-based LTCH-specific market basket to reflect a 2013 base year. In conjunction with that policy, as discussed in section VIII.C. of the preamble of this final rule, we are establishing that the LTCH PPS labor-related share for FY 2018 is the sum of the FY 2018 relative importance of each labor-related cost category in the 2013-based LTCH market basket using the most recent available data. Specifically, we are establishing that the labor-related share for FY 2018 includes the sum of the labor-related portion of operating costs from the 2013-based LTCH market basket (that is, the sum of the FY 2018 relative importance share of Wages and Salaries; Employee Benefits; Professional Fees: Labor-Related; Administrative and Facilities Support Services; Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Services; All Other: Labor-related Services) and a portion of the Capital-Related cost weight from the 2013-based LTCH PPS market basket. Based on IGI's second quarter 2017 forecast of the 2013-based LTCH market basket, we are establishing a labor-related share under the LTCH PPS for FY 2018 of 66.2 percent. This labor-related share is determined using the same methodology as employed in calculating all previous LTCH PPS labor-related shares. Consistent with our historical practice, as we proposed, we used more recent data available to determine the final FY 2018 labor-related share in this final rule.

He Tirohanga Mokopuna, the Treasury's 2016 Statement on New Zealand's Long-Term Fiscal Position, was published on 22 November 2016.

long term fiscal position - New Zealand Treasury

Why "we can't forecast" doesn't mean "we don't know anything." The difference between unconditional forecasting -- "what will happen?" which we are not very good at, and conditional forecasting or "what will be the effect of x policy" which we are pretty good at.

A wide ranging interview: Dodd-Frank, financial regulation, monetary policy, fiscal theory, recessions, inequality, and who are my heroes.

Under section 1886(q)(5)(D) of the Act, the Secretary has the authority to specify the applicable period with respect to a fiscal year under the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program. In the FY 2012 IPPS/LTCH PPS final rule (), we finalized our policy to use 3 years of claims data to calculate the readmission measures. In the FY 2013 IPPS/LTCH PPS final rule (), we codified the definition of “applicable period” in the regulations at as the 3-year period from which data is collected in order to calculate excess readmissions ratios and adjustments for the fiscal year, which includes aggregate payments for excess readmissions and aggregate payments for all discharges used in the calculation of the payment adjustment.

7) The Phillips curve is dead 8) Long-term fiscal policy, not Fed mistakes, pose the greatest danger to inflation.

Read Chinese Fiscal Policy free essay and over 88,000 other ..

This paper examines the validity of this claim and investigates the properties of alternative monetary policy rules based on control of the monetary base or a monetary aggregate in lieu of the capacity to manipulate a short-term interest rate.

Find and download essays and research papers on FISCAL POLICY

Analysis based on a new measure of financial distress for 24 advanced economies in the postwar period shows substantial variation in the aftermath of financial crises. This paper examines the role that macroeconomic policy plays in explaining this variation. We find that the degree of monetary and fiscal policy space prior to financial distress—that is, whether the policy interest rate is above the zero lower bound and whether the debt-to-GDP ratio is relatively low—greatly affects the aftermath of crises. The decline in output following a crisis is less than 1 percent when a country possesses both types of policy space, but almost 10 percent when it has neither. The difference is highly statistically significant and robust to the measures of policy space and the sample. We also consider the mechanisms by which policy space matters. We find that monetary and fiscal policy are used more aggressively when policy space is ample. Financial distress itself is also less persistent when there is policy space. The findings may have implications for policy during both normal times and periods of acute financial distress.

Essay on Fiscal Policy - 2035 Words - StudyMode

In the 1930s, with the United States reeling from the Great Depression, the government began to use fiscal policy not just to support itself or pursue social policies but to promote overall economic growth and stability as well. Policy-makers were influenced by John Maynard Keynes, an English economist who argued in (1936) that the rampant joblessness of his time resulted from inadequate demand for goods and services. According to Keynes, people did not have enough income to buy everything the economy could produce, so prices fell and companies lost money or went bankrupt. Without government intervention, Keynes said, this could become a vicious cycle. As more companies went bankrupt, he argued, more people would lose their jobs, making income fall further and leading yet more companies to fail in a frightening downward spiral. Keynes argued that government could halt the decline by increasing spending on its own or by cutting taxes. Either way, incomes would rise, people would spend more, and the economy could start growing again. If the government had to run up a deficit to achieve this purpose, so be it, Keynes said. In his view, the alternative -- deepening economic decline -- would be worse.
Keynes's ideas were only partially accepted during the 1930s, but the huge boom in military spending during World War II seemed to confirm his theories. As government spending surged, people's incomes rose, factories again operated at full capacity, and the hardships of the Depression faded into memory. After the war, the economy continued to be fueled by pent-up demand from families who had deferred buying homes and starting families.
By the 1960s, policy-makers seemed wedded to Keynesian theories. But in retrospect, most Americans agree, the government then made a series of mistakes in the economic policy arena that eventually led to a reexamination of fiscal policy. After enacting a tax cut in 1964 to stimulate economic growth and reduce unemployment, President Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969) and Congress launched a series of expensive domestic spending programs designed to alleviate poverty. Johnson also increased military spending to pay for American involvement in the Vietnam War. These large government programs, combined with strong consumer spending, pushed the demand for goods and services beyond what the economy could produce. Wages and prices started rising. Soon, rising wages and prices fed each other in an ever-rising cycle. Such an overall increase in prices is known as inflation.
Keynes had argued that during such periods of excess demand, the government should reduce spending or raise taxes to avert inflation. But anti-inflation fiscal policies are difficult to sell politically, and the government resisted shifting to them. Then, in the early 1970s, the nation was hit by a sharp rise in international oil and food prices. This posed an acute dilemma for policy-makers. The conventional anti-inflation strategy would be to restrain demand by cutting federal spending or raising taxes. But this would have drained income from an economy already suffering from higher oil prices. The result would have been a sharp rise in unemployment. If policy-makers chose to counter the loss of income caused by rising oil prices, however, they would have had to increase spending or cut taxes. Since neither policy could increase the supply of oil or food, however, boosting demand without changing supply would merely mean higher prices.
President Jimmy Carter (1973-1977) sought to resolve the dilemma with a two-pronged strategy. He geared fiscal policy toward fighting unemployment, allowing the federal deficit to swell and establishing countercyclical jobs programs for the unemployed. To fight inflation, he established a program of voluntary wage and price controls. Neither element of this strategy worked well. By the end of the 1970s, the nation suffered both high unemployment and high inflation.
While many Americans saw this "stagflation" as evidence that Keynesian economics did not work, another factor further reduced the government's ability to use fiscal policy to manage the economy. Deficits now seemed to be a permanent part of the fiscal scene. Deficits had emerged as a concern during the stagnant 1970s. Then, in the 1980s, they grew further as President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) pursued a program of tax cuts and increased military spending. By 1986, the deficit had swelled to $221,000 million, or more than 22 percent of total federal spending. Now, even if the government wanted to pursue spending or tax policies to bolster demand, the deficit made such a strategy unthinkable.
Beginning in the late 1980s, reducing the deficit became the predominant goal of fiscal policy. With foreign trade opportunities expanding rapidly and technology spinning off new products, there seemed to be little need for government policies to stimulate growth. Instead, officials argued, a lower deficit would reduce government borrowing and help bring down interest rates, making it easier for businesses to acquire capital to finance expansion. The government budget finally returned to surplus in 1998. This led to calls for new tax cuts, but some of the enthusiasm for lower taxes was tempered by the realization that the government would face major budget challenges early in the new century as the enormous post-war baby-boom generation reached retirement and started collecting retirement checks from the Social Security system and medical benefits from the Medicare program.
By the late 1990s, policy-makers were far less likely than their predecessors to use fiscal policy to achieve broad economic goals. Instead, they focused on narrower policy changes designed to strengthen the economy at the margins. President Reagan and his successor, George Bush (1989-1993), sought to reduce taxes on capital gains -- that is, increases in wealth resulting from the appreciation in the value of assets such as property or stocks. They said such a change would increase incentives to save and invest. Democrats resisted, arguing that such a change would overwhelmingly benefit the rich. But as the budget deficit shrank, President Clinton (1993-2001) acquiesced, and the maximum capital gains rate was trimmed to 20 percent from 28 percent in 1996. Clinton, meanwhile, also sought to affect the economy by promoting various education and job-training programs designed to develop a highly skilled -- and hence, more productive and competitive -- labor force.