The Soviet-American Arms Race | History Today
It therefore recommended the government work with like-minded states to: strengthen the NPT regime; press for further nuclear arms reductions; strengthen the UN Conventional Arms Register; and work to control the production, import and export of landmines.
Timeline | Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Wittner shows that Reagan officials were worried because, in their view, the United States and European public protest movements dominated the political and security concerns of the governments and opposition parties in Europe, dominated US public opinion in the run up to the 1984 and 1986 elections, and were influencing members of Congress on issues of military spending and arms procurement. In an effort to offset these successes of the protest movements, Reagan officials publicly embraced arms control in the form of their proposals for the INF Treaty (abolishing intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe) and the talks on Strategic Arms Reductions (START I and START II).
On 23 July, President Clinton signed H.R. 4 into law. In a statement obviously intended to reassure Moscow, Clinton stressed the importance of the to provisos: "By specifying that any NMD deployment must be subject to [authorization procedures]...the legislation makes clear that no decision on deployment has been made. ... [The legislation also reaffirms] my Administration's position that our national missile defense policy must take into account our arms control and nuclear non-proliferation objectives." (See this issue for the full text of Clinton's statement.) Russia, however, expressed itself appalled by Clinton's signing of the Act, and expressed grave reservations about the rush of developments towards deployment. The Clinton Administration has set itself a deadline of no later than the end of June next year to decide whether to proceed with an NMD system. In effect, as a decision to proceed is highly likely, June 2000 is also the deadline for seeking to agree ABM Treaty modifications with Russia.
7.2 Declared States - The Nuclear Weapon Archive
Moreover, for the most part, the nations concerned have restrained nuclear testing, production, and deployment in the same way that they would have if the nuclear arms control agreements were formally ratified and fully in effect. The United States and Russia have kept their strategic nuclear forces close to the START II limits. The signatories to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)have all stopped testing nuclear weapons and show no sign of resuming. No country that has signed and ratified the Nonproliferation Treaty has withdrawn in order to acquire nuclear weapons. North Korea threatened to withdraw, but has "suspended" its withdrawal. And the new nuclear states (Israel, India, and Pakistan) had all refused to sign unless and until much greater progress was made toward nuclear disarmament on the part of the United States and Russia.
Canada's Role in the Atomic Bomb Programs of the US, …
Still, the world has been coasting on past successes. There are signs of much more dangerous new developments if we do not get arms control back on track. But Rogov suggests that it is going to be particularly difficult to revive arms control because all arms control restraints to date have built on two models, neither of which is helpful for the near future: two party equal cuts (or equal ceilings), and multi-party bans. Previous arms control agreements included a slight adaptation: they involved either two-party US-Russian limits or the multi-party bans, such as in the Nonproliferation Treaty and the CTBT; but the latter recognized Britain, France, and China as nuclear-weapon states whose much smaller arsenals were not subject to specific agreed limits for the moment.
Arms Control and Disarmament Treaties - Encyclopedia …
This most recent incarnation of missile defense, following the ultimately banned ABM developments of the 1960s and the costly, fruitless SDI studies of the 1980s, is, more than any other single factor, likely to put a permanent end to nuclear arms control. At the same time, this program is likely to stimulate an unprecedented global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These dangerous possibilities took a step closer to reality in December, when China announced that, in response to the American decision to proceed with its missile defense program, China will build six nuclear-powered submarines, each carrying sixteen missiles with six nuclear warheads on each missile--that is, a total of 576 nuclear warheads. While small by United States and Russian standards, this prospective nuclear build-up in China represents another watershed event, and is an almost certain trigger to comparable nuclear buildups in India, Pakistan, and possibly other countries. Until now, China has been the only country in the world with a genuine "minimum deterrent" nuclear arsenal. Having first acquired nuclear weapons in 1964, China remained content for 35 years with an arsenal that comprised some twenty nuclear warheads and twenty missiles, kept on "de-alert" status, with the missiles stored in, and protected by, deep caves, not in position ready to fire with the warheads on them. This small force could not be assured of penetrating the proposed new US national missile defenses, and therefore China is planning to build a larger force which will be able to do so. India is likely to want to keep pace with China, and Pakistan will want to keep pace with India.