How to Change Your Perceptions and Change Your Life
The objects of intentional states are sometimes called“intentional objects” (Crane (2001: Chapter 1)). What arethe intentional objects of perceptual experience, according tointentionalists? In the case of veridical perception, the answer issimple: ordinary, mind-independent objects like the churchyard, thesnow (etc.) and their properties. But what should be said about thehallucinatory case? Since this case is by definition one in whichthere is no mind-independent object being perceived, how can we eventalk about something being an “object of experience” atall here? As noted above, intentionalists say that experiences arerepresentations; and one can represent what does not exist (see Harman(1990), Tye (1992)). This is certainly true; but isn’t there anymore to be said? For how does a representation of a non-existentchurchyard differ from a representation of a non-existent garbagedump, say, when one of those is hallucinated? The states seem to havedifferent objects; but neither of these objects exist (see the entry).
Perceptions de la vie – Perceptions of Life!!
The issue about whether the content of perceptual experience issingular or general is not simply about whether the existence of theexperience entails or presupposes the existence of its object. Anexample will illustrate this. Suppose for the sake of argument thatexperience essentially involves the exercise of recognitionalcapacities, and I have a capacity to recognise the Queen. Let’ssuppose too that this is a general capacity which presupposes herexistence. It is consistent with this to say that I could be in thesame intentional state when I am hallucinating the Queen, as when I amperceiving her. Although the capacity might depend for its existenceon the Queen’s existence, not every exercise of the capacityneed depend on the Queen’s presence. The capacity can“misfire”. Hence intentionalism can hold that experiencesare the same in the hallucinatory and veridical cases, even though theexistence of the involved recognitional capacity presupposes theexistence of the object recognised.
On the face of it the indirect realist form of the sense-datumtheory salvages something of our ordinary conception ofperceptual experience, but securing Awareness. But thisshouldn’t be at all satisfying to one who wants to defend ourintuitive conception of perceptual experience, for two reasons. First,Openness is still being denied. Second, once we are given thedistinction between direct and indirect perception, a defender of ourordinary conception of perceptual experience is likely to upholdAwareness in a more specific form, that is, as the idea thatperceptual experience sometimes gives us direct awareness ofordinary objects. That is, the main theories of experience whichuphold our ordinary conception of perceptualexperience—intentionalism and naive realism—are bothusually regarded as versions of direct realism.
Change Your Perceptions, Change Your Reality | …
This principle does not beg the question against perspectivalism bysmuggling in an assumption about causal asymmetry. For it is surely atrivial fact about our perception of time that if A is experienced asoccurring before B, A and B cannot be experienced as simultaneous. Andit is surely an objective (although non-trivial) fact that ourexperience of A will be causally between A and our experience ofB. Now if perspectivalism cannot answer the challenge to explain thetruth of the above principle, it seems that our experience of temporalasymmetry, insofar as it has a causal explanation, requires causationto be objectively asymmetric.
Perceptions (Thoughts on Life 1#) | Zampano's House
Here is what we find: The sense-datum theorist rejects our ordinaryconception of perceptual experience. The adverbial theorist tries toimprove upon the sense-datum theory, and holds on toAwareness. But it is unclear how they can secureOpenness. Intentionalists and naive realists hold to bothOpenness and Awareness, but they do so in differentways, and with different responses to the Problem of Perception. (Theway these positions emerge in response to the Problem of Perception ismapped most clearly in Martin (1995, 1998, 2000)).
rigid perceptions | Persevering Through Life's Challenges
Though it is not plausible to deny the possibility of illusoryexperiences (though we may argue about how best to construe them;Anthony (2011) and Kalderon (2011)), the claim that subjectivelyindistinguishable hallucinations are possible is a little morecontroversial. How do we really know that experiences like this arepossible? (Austin (1962), for instance, expresses scepticism). One wayto answer this—though certainly not the only way—is toappeal to a broad and uncontroversial empirical fact about experience:that it is the upshot or outcome of a causal process linking theorgans of perception with the environment, that our experiences arethe effects of things going on inside and outside our bodies. If thisis so, then we can understand why hallucinations are apossibility. For any causal chain reaching from a cause C1to effect E, there are intermediate causes C2,C3 etc., such that E could have been brought about even ifC1 had not been there but one of the later causes (see theentry on ). If this is true of causal processes in general, andperceptual experience is the product of a causal process, then we cansee how it is possible that I could have an experience of thechurchyard which was brought about by causes “downstream”of the actual cause (the churchyard). (This plays into the causalargument discussed in ).